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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to review political and material deprivation as a basis for social 
protest during the pre – revolution period in Georgia, within the framework of Relative Deprivation 
theory. The linkage between relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient, as well type of existing 
political regime and Soviet past is considered. The originality of this paper is conditioned by the new 
approach to Colour Revolutions, as previous studies are considered a precondition for comprehending 
social protest against rigged elections, the lack of democracy. This research is based on a qualitative 
research methodology, the basic methodological approach being the method of the case study. Among 
with in – depth interviews and content analysis of academic materials, quantitative data of World 
Bank and Freedom House coefficients are also used. Empirical analysis proves the existence of 
political and material deprivation between social groups through the review of Gini coefficient data 
for the research period. This research shows the methodological value considering relative 
deprivation in conjunction with the Gini coefficient as a more quantifiable method than existing 
approaches to explain the reasons for the Rose Revolution in Georgia. 
Keywords: Hybrid Regime; Gini coefficient; post – Soviet Transition 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents research about the Colour Revolutions in post – Soviet 
countries and is designed to evaluate the factors which influenced society’s 
decisions during the pre – revolution period in Georgia. 
Regime change may be influenced by internal or external factors. Many current 
studies on this topic review the institutional factors which contribute to regime 
change, while others focus on social factors, such as social transformation. 
According to some researchers, the primary factor influencing Colour Revolutions 
in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine was a fraudulent national election, not a war, an 
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economic crisis, an external shock or international factor, or the death of a 
dictator (McFaul, 2005). 
Other researchers add that, opposition’s strength, built on the foundations of a free 
media, pluralistic civil society and open society, was sufficient to mobilize 
impressive crowds so as to show their outrage at the attempts to tamper with 
election results (Polese & Beachain, 2011). 
From the abovementioned viewpoint, this paper reviews the case of Georgia’s Rose 
Revolution, taking into account events and conditions in Georgia from 1991 to 
2003. The Gini coefficient is used to measure material deprivation. Relative 
Deprivation theory provides a theoretical framework, which explains society’s 
motivation to change the regime taking into consideration the existence of political 
and material deprivation as causes of social protest. Other contributing factors are 
the recollection in post-Soviet societies of past experience with a formally 
egalitarian regime, and an existing political regime type, which allows social 
protest to bring about the desired results. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate society’s role in regime change during the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia. The innovativeness of the model of this research paper 
stems from the fact that it is an attempt to explain the issue differently from the 
existing approaches – by using quantifiable variables. 
As for the methodology, research answers theoretically and empirically important 
assumption: did social protest as a result of political and material deprivation lead 
to regime change? It also aims to verify link between acting political regime type 
and social protest dynamics, describe the case of Georgia, evaluate influence of 
Soviet past on citizens’ attitudes, to test the validity of the Relative Deprivation 
theory. 
As the paper does not cover verification of alternative explanations, one 
methodological limitation of the research is the analysis of the only case through 
two coefficients, but the theory aims to pay attention to interpretation and not to 
confirm the existence of any theoretical model. 
For data analysis the following techniques are used: analysis of primary sources – 
World Bank and Freedom House data, secondary sources analysis – content 
analysis of scientific literature, not only in the theoretical frame, but also in specific 
cases, in – depth interviews. 
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Relative Deprivation theory is formulated as testable hypotheses. This approach 
enables empirical verification of how well theory explains social protest caused by 
political and material deprivation and its influence on regime change. The level 
used for analysis is the macro level – society, as the most relevant level for this 
type of behavioral explanation. 
This paper is divided into two parts: one theoretical and the other empirical. 
In the theoretical part is reviewed the content of academic sources, the theoretical 
frame of the research (Relative Deprivation theory), poverty (material deprivation) 
and inequality (relative deprivation) are separated, the link between the existing 
regime type and regime change is shown. 
The empirical part of the research is dedicated to the Georgia case study, 
considering the role of political elites (acting government and opposition), civil 
society, non – governmental institutions, taking into consideration the theoretical 
frame and measuring coefficients of the research. 
In conclusion, the hypothesis are confirmed or rejected. 
 
2. Relative Deprivation and Social Protest 
Relative deprivation has been linked to definable and measurable social and 
psychological reactions, such as different types of alienation” (Durant & 
Christian, 1990) by social psychologists and to social protests, discrimination, 
feelings of injustice and subjective ill-being (Olson, 1986). It has also been used to 
interpret measures of inequality and income redistribution (Yitzhaki, 1979; 
Duclos, 2000) as cited in (Duclos & Gregoire, 2001). 
Relative Deprivation measures material, political, or social deprivation that are 
relative rather than absolute. The term is linked to poverty and social exclusion. 
This concept is important for both behavior and attitudes, and participation 
in collective action. Some who suffer from status disequilibrium, in which their 
success in some areas is not matched by equal success in other areas, actually 
become withdrawn, alienated from the system they may silently blame, doubtful of 
their own personal abilities, and beset by feelings of hopelessness regarding theirs 
and the system's future. These are not, however, the persons who tend to join 
protests. What little empirical data are available point to the fact that persons who 
do join such protests have quite high hopes for the future, that compared to those 
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of similar status who do not participate, those who do participate have a higher 
regard for their own personal capabilities and personal efficacy (Arora, 1971). 
If considering the politics of the country within the research period, political 
participation in Georgia was restricted by the corrupted state system. 
For research purposes, personal income should be considered as a coefficient of the 
individual's ability to consume commodities, as each unit of income represents a 
different bundle of commodities that a person is able to consume (Yitzhaki, 1979). 
Income is considered as the object of relative deprivation. 
Relative Deprivation theory explains the motivation of society during the pre – 
revolutionary period in Georgia. According to the aforementioned theory, relative 
deprivation is defined as a perception of difference by the person between 
expectations (welfare, what a person believes he/she deserves) and reality when 
comparing themselves to others (Gurr, 2005). 
Runciman broadened the relative deprivation construct by his invaluable 
distinction between egoistic (individual) and fraternal (group) relative derivation. 
People can believe that they are unfairly personally deprived (individual relative 
deprivation – IRD) or that a social group to which they belong and identify is 
unfairly deprived (group relative deprivation – GRD). Later he developed concept 
of relative deprivation experienced on behalf of others. Concept refers to the 
feeling of discontent one experiences when perceiving that members of another 
group are unfairly treated (Walker & Smith, 2002). 
A person is relatively deprived of X when: he does not have X, he sees another 
person or other people, who may consider themselves as having X unexpectedly 
(whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), he wants X, he sees it feasible to 
have X (Yitzhaki, 1979). 
Gurr posits that relative deprivation is the anger or distress that results from a 
discrepancy between “should” and “is”. More formally, his central proposition is: 
RD=
𝑉𝐸−𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐸
 
Where RD stands for “relative deprivation”, VE stands for “value expectations” 
and VC stands for “value capabilities”. Value expectations are the goods and 
opportunities, which people want and to which they feel entitled, value capabilities 
are the goods and opportunities which they have or think it feasible to attain. Gurr 
identifies three patterns of deprivation: aspirational [Figure 1], decremental [Figure 
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2], and progressive [Figure 3]. Aspirational deprivation occurs when value 
capabilities remain constant over time while value expectations increase. 
Decremental deprivation occurs when value capabilities decrease over time while 
value expectations remain constant. In progressive deprivation, value capabilities 
decrease while value expectations increase (Crosby, 1979). 
 
Figure 1. Aspirational Deprivation 
 
Figure 2. Decremental Deprivation 
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Figure 3. Progressive Deprivation 
Based on data of satisfaction of society in Georgia for the 1996 – 2003 period 
[Figure 4], we can conclude that the type of economic deprivation is progressive. 
 
Figure 4. Data of satisfaction of society, Georgia, period 1996 – 2003 
For research purposes, average income is used as data on society satisfaction. The 
area between the GDP Per Capita and average income lines is an area of collective 
relative deprivation. The average income coefficient is measured by the formula: 
μ = (1 − G) 
Where µ - is average income coefficient, G - is Gini coefficient. 
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Average income is a multiplication of GDP Per Capita and average income 
coefficient (µ). 
The Gini Coefficient can be approached from either of two directions. First, it can 
be regarded as the salient summary statistic of the Lorenz Curve of the income 
distribution. The Lorenz Curve, to be denoted L(u), is the proportion of the total 
income of the economy that is received by the lowest l00u% of income receivers. 
From this point of view, the Gini Coefficient is the area between a given Lorenz 
Curve and the Lorenz Curve for an economy in which everyone receives the same 
income, expressed as a proportion of the area under the curve for the equal 
distribution of income. (Dorfman, 1979) 
GDP Per capita and Gini coefficient data are taken from the World Bank database.1 
In analyzing the underlying causes of the French Revolution, De Tocqueville noted 
that the greatest dissatisfaction manifested itself ironically in those areas and 
among those sectors which had seen a sharp economic improvement in the 1780s. 
More contemporarily, Olson advanced a thesis, which argued that, economic 
growth may paradoxically increase the number of those who become poor and/or 
dissatisfied. (Olsun, 1993) 
While the country's average income is rising quickly, the median income may drop 
as a result of an unequal division of the expanding economic pie. Even if the 
majority of the public enjoys rising income many or even most may lose out in 
relative terms. This is especially true when rapid growth is accompanied by high 
inflation. 
The phenomenon of rapid economic growth can cause economic class disruption 
as well as the breakdown of traditional institutions and behavior patterns – all 
leading to socio – political instability (As cited in S. Lehman – Wilzig, 1985). 
The current model of explaining a society’s protest foresees the existence of the 
three following prerequisites: conditions which are the reasons for society’s 
dissatisfaction, conditions that assure the risk to society of political protest is 
justified, and conditions occurring when interdependence between the actions of a 
dissatisfied society and government abilities neutralize society’s protest. It should 
be mentioned that the individual is indifferent to the income transfers among those 
who are poorer than he is and/or richer than he is. 
                                                          
1. World Bank page, accessed: 15.12.2016. 
http:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=GE. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=GE. 
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According to the Freedom House Nation in Transit report, the democracy scores 
and regime ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest 
level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The democracy scores and regime 
ratings are calculated according to the electoral process in country, civil society, 
independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance 
development, judicial framework and independence, and corruption levels. The 
following political regime types are considered: Consolidated Democracy, Semi – 
Consolidated Democracy, Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime, Semi – 
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime, Consolidated Authoritarian Regime.1 
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income or 
consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents 
perfect equality, while a coefficient of 100 implies perfect inequality.2 
To simplify the model, the attitudes of the political elites and civil society are 
reviewed, while the question of how to evaluate the role of the third actor - the 
middle class - is be overridden, because when taking into consideration the 
country’s development parameters (according to the research - Gini coefficient), 
the middle class did not exist and could not influence the political environment. 
Taking into consideration the research interests and in order to be more precise, the 
term “deprivation” should be considered as both absolute deprivation (poverty) and 
relative deprivation. 
Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty 
when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the activities 
and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least 
widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their 
resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or 
family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and 
activities. (Duclos, 2001) 
Taking into consideration current research interests, it is not important to separate 
social groups under absolute and relative deprivation. Both groups had sufficient 
motivation to rebel against the existing government, but according to the Gini 
                                                          
1. Freedom House page, accessed 15.12.2016. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2015#.VmtGG_nRKko. 
2. World Bank page, accessed: 15.12.2016. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. 
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coefficient data, which reflects relative deprivation in numbers, the part of society 
with a higher income than the average is overlooked, as they could not influence 
political processes. 
Once the basic theoretical assumptions and concepts have been defined and the 
main arguments discussed in advance, the principal task which has to be performed 
is to see whether the empirical work confirms the proposed hypothesis. The 
remaining part of this paper revolves around this task. 
 
3. Political Situation in Georgia (1991 – 2003) 
3.1. Review of Alternative Explanations 
The research is based on scientific literature about the definition of political 
regimes and specificities of the post – Communist political systems, interviews 
with professors collected in Georgia and Ukraine and Romania during visits to 
Kyiv – Mohyla Academy, the University of Bucharest, and University Babes-
Bolyai. Through primary sources which describe the ongoing situation in Georgia, 
considering the chronological frame, the theoretical frame and model are described, 
and World Bank and Freedom House primary sources are used which pertain to 
research coefficients and materials and describe calculation rules. 
There exist several hypotheses about the requirements of a democratic transition. 
Seymour Martin Lipset mentions that economic development is essential, Samuel 
Huntington and Ronald Inglehart name common cultural characteristics, Fareed 
Zakaria and Russell Bova underline the liberal regime experience, even under 
colonial rule, Robert Putnam outlines social capital and trust, Adam Przeworski 
argues that the most important is the growth of income equality. Everyone agrees 
that amongst democracies, some level of shared political values and loyalties are 
needed, which is basic for political agreements on common rules. Without dialogue 
and negotiation within some recognized options, democracy will be temporary 
suspended, as Hobsbawm mentions (Jones, 2013). 
In the case of Georgia, political segregation, long – term absence of statehood, and 
a civil society fragmented according to personal loyalty led to the weakening of 
national society. 
By 2003, Georgia seemed to be headed for, if it had not already reached, the status 
of a “failed state”. That year, the influential Corruption Perceptions Index 
maintained by Transparency International (TI) ranked Georgia among the world’s 
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most corrupt countries (124th out of 133 surveyed). The index is compiled using 
surveys of businesspeople and others, with the goal of naming what are thought to 
be the most corrupt places to carry on operations. The dim view of Georgia 
expressed in TI’s index put that country in the same dismal vicinity as Angola, 
Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan – all notorious hotbeds of corruption (Kupatadze, 2016). 
The two prerequisites required for a social rebellion are: firstly, political 
institutions are incapable of providing channels for the participation of new social 
forces in politics and of the new elites in government, and secondly, the desire of 
social forces, currently excluded from politics, to participate therein. Inclusion 
desire arises from the group’s perception, that symbolic or material gains can 
achieve only by pressing its demands in the political sphere. Ascending or aspiring 
groups and rigid or inflexible institutions are the effects of which revolutions are 
made (Huntington, 2006). 
The academic materials on which this research is based provide characterizations 
of hybrid regimes. The materials mentioned above are valuable for research, 
because they explain the specificity of transitional regime politics. “Third wave of 
democratization”, by Samuel Huntington, defines the promoting and impeding of 
the factors of democratic transformation in post – Soviet countries. He argues that 
political elites are the main decision makers. Michael McFoul outlines the role of 
political elites and does not regard Colour Revolutions as a precondition of 
democratization. 
For the data interpretation, it is important to analyze accompanying political and 
social factors in the countries in question. Some political scientists argue that 
countries with an authoritarian political regime give less opportunity for society’s 
protests to bring about desired results.1 
For this purpose, data of Freedom House Nation in Transit report is reviewed. 
According to political scientists’ opinions, social dissatisfaction was caused by the 
unequal distribution of economic welfare. The rigged election also contributed to 
society’s dissatisfaction.2 
Opposition and nongovernmental organizations managed to assure the society that 
political protest would bring about the desired result – a change of regime. In the 
case of Georgia and Ukraine, their existing regimes (Shevardnadze, Kuchma) 
                                                          
1 Authors’ interview with Haran Olexiy, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Professor. Kyiv, 2012. 
2 Authors’ interview with Ivan Gomza, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Professor. Kyiv, 2012. 
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enabled public protest to bring desired results, which was not allowed in Belarus 
by Lukashenko (Polese & Beachain, 2011). 
The main factors leading to success were also acknowledged: the activity of the 
civil society, which with international support, managed to monitor the election 
process, the creation of a broad oppositional front, which used non-violent tactics, 
the emphasis on the issue of social justice helped to overcome anti-western 
stereotypes and the polarizing strategy of the regime, international condemnation 
of the falsifications and the West’s demand to renounce the use of force, and the 
roundtable with the EU and OSCE’s mediation (Haran, 2012). 
A Professor at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Haran Olexiy argues that absence of 
opposition strengthens civil society.1 
 
3.2. Results of Gini Coefficient Data Review 
Information about the Gini coefficient in Georgia as a measurement of economic 
deprivation in numbers has existed since 1996, but a short historical overview of 
the period between 1991 and 1995 is important to comprehend ongoing political 
processes in the country and the grounds for future political choices. 
According to the World Bank database, the Gini coefficient varied between 37 – 
42% during the research period. The highest index of inequality was reported in 
1997 – 42%.2 
As for the other post – Communist countries where social protest lead to regime 
change, in Ukraine, the Gini coefficient varied between 28 – 39%, and in the 
Kyrgyz Republic between 28 – 53%. 
It is crucial to review accompanying political and social factors, while interpreting 
Gini coefficient data. As it was mentioned, countries with an authoritarian political 
regime give less opportunity to for society’s protest to bring about desired results. 
According to the Freedom House “Nations in Transit” report, during the pre-
revolutionary period in Georgia and Ukraine existing regime type was transitional 
(hybrid), while in the Kyrgyz Republic it was semi-consolidated authoritarianism. 
None of those countries were rated as consolidated authoritarians.3 
                                                          
1 Authors’ interview with Haran Olexiy, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Professor. Kyiv, 2012. 
2  World Bank page, accessed: 15.12.2016. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. 
3 Freedom House page, accessed: 15.12.2016. 
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In other post-Soviet countries, Gini coefficient distribution was as follows (as 
calculated median, for the period 1991 – 2003): Azerbaijan – 18%, Belarus – 30%, 
Tajikistan – 33%, Kazakhstan – 33%, Uzbekistan – 36%, Armenia – 36%, 
Moldova – 36%, Turkmenistan – 38%, Russia – 40%. The political regime type in 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Russia 
is consolidated authoritarianism, in Armenia semi – consolidated authoritarianism, 
and in Moldova between transitional (hybrid) regime and semi – consolidated 
authoritarianism. 
Corruption in Georgia for the pre – revolutionary period can be proven through the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI). Scores 
range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Data exists since 1999, according 
to which in 1999 Georgia occupied the 84th place among 99 countries (score 2.3), 
in 2002 85th place among 102 countries (score 2.4), and in 2003 124th place among 
133 countries (score 1.8).1 
3.3. Georgia for the Period 1991 – 2003 
After the restoration of the independence of Georgia, the country’s policy may be 
divided into several main phases. The first phase began when Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
came to power and the independence of the country was declared, and continued 
until 1992. The second phase matches the international recognition of the 
independence of Georgia and the return of Eduard Shevardnadze. It continued until 
2003. However, during Shevardnadze’s rule one may allocate two sub – periods: 
The first is 1992-1995, when the country lost the war in Abkhazia and joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in November 1993, the “Citizens 
Union of Georgia” was established as a new political party chaired by 
Shevardnadze, which propagated civil consent and the rule of law. The party aimed 
to unite communists and young post - communists, and quickly turned into a 
mechanism for distributing political and economic benefits among the supporters 
of the new regime, a political process served private satisfaction and responded to 
the pressure of interest groups. While the second sub – period begins with the 
adoption of the 1995 Constitution, ensuring stability in the country and continues 
until 2003. Membership of the Council of Europe (1999) commenced during the 
second period, and was regarded as an important recognition of Georgia’s 
European orientation. In November 2002, at the NATO Prague summit, 
                                                                                                                                                   
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2015#.VmtGG_nRKko. 
1. Transparency International page, accessed: 15.12.2016. 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_early/0/ 9. 
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Shevardnadze declared his country’s willingness to join the alliance. Political 
situation became more stable, and it was possible to receive international and 
financial aid and support, but the country was left in a poor economic condition. 
The lack of the rule of law allowed corrupt public service officials to receive 
financial benefits by using service status to solicit bribes. The discrepancies in 
distributing welfare among society’s groups increased. 
The country was evaluated as a “public order with limited access”, where 
participation in political process was blocked by poverty, inequality and system 
hierarchy (Jones, 2013). 
Georgia was characterized by political and economic polarization. Georgian 
citizens, especially those from poor neighbourhoods or living outside Tbilisi, were 
banished from national politics. The governments since 1991 failed to fill that gap 
which existed between society and elites. 
Political sociology defines power as an ability of an individual or social group to 
pursue a course of action. In analysing political action, chiefly struggles for power, 
we need to look primarily at the activities of social groups, rather than at the 
actions of individuals. There is a link between political culture, economic 
development and the construction of successful democracy. Political values and 
norms, especially in a dynamic period of change, affect legitimacy, the party 
system, the degree of participation and political conflict. 
The society’s focus, on the one hand, is on economic issues, such as the fight 
against price increases, and on the other hand, on post materialistic values, self-
expression, civil rights, protection and promotion of public participation in 
government decision-making. (Bottomore, 1993) 
Georgia received the most support per capita from the USA of all ex – Soviet 
Republics. Despite the large amount of aid, most of the population was still living 
below the poverty level. Western states were defeated in Georgia, as they did not 
achieve their objectives. They were not able to create a stable economy and a 
democratic state. The IMF plan, created for former Soviet republics, was almost 
Bolshevik, one might say, taking into consideration its size and unbreakable 
conviction, which contributed to political instability and economic downturn, even 
though it had been developed to prevent the above. In addition, it exacerbated 
tensions between economic and political liberalization. (Jones, 2013) 
Political inequality is almost an inherent aspect of political instability. 
(Huntington, 1993) 
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One must take into consideration the external support which complemented a 
network of NGOs and political activists ready to act in a non – traditional way – 
they challenged the authority of the regime and thought of the best way to adapt 
the imported theories of action to their situation. This political opportunity boosted 
civic activism and was the basis for national and international networks aiming to 
challenge the authorities through domestic and global channels and set up a 
network of trainers in civil disobedience, who are now operating worldwide in 
relative secrecy. During the pre-revolution period, the main mistake committed by 
the regime in Georgia was to have built a weak coercive apparatus. This went 
along with the opposition’s success in finding a charismatic leader, mobilizing the 
electorate, its ability to learn from the Serbians and apply their experience to the 
Georgian context, as well as the coordination with security forces to avoid 
repression (Polese & Beachain, 2011). 
It should be mentioned, that the majority of Georgians relied on the leader’s 
personal courage, influence and financial resources, which are an obstacle to 
political stability and economic development. 
To summarize research on this period, it should be mentioned, that from 1991 
before 2003 was defined course for foreign policy, which shaped the country’s 
priorities in the following period. However, it did not overcome political and 
material deprivation, corruption and the absence of the rule of law, which may 
become a precondition for public protests. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to evaluate society’s role in the change of government 
during the Rose Revolution in Georgia in the framework of Relative Deprivation 
theory, relying on the Gini coefficient. 
The summarizing task, divided into two parts, will reconnect the theoretical 
conclusions and generalize political processes. 
In the empirical part of the paper, it has become clear that Relative Deprivation 
theory adequately explains the research hypothesis, according to which a high level 
of political and material deprivation became the reason for society’s dissatisfaction, 
as Georgia was a post-Soviet country, with a more or less egalitarian society. The 
existing regime allowed social protest to bring about the desired result – regime 
change – considering the theoretical assumption that countries with authoritarian 
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political regime give less opportunity for society’s protest to bring about the 
desired result. 
The calculation of the collective relative deprivation gap between average income 
and society satisfaction shows that the existing material deprivation was sufficient 
to trigger social protest. 
Corruption and deprivation of political participation between the society groups 
contributed to the formation of the nongovernmental sector. Western-educated 
Georgian citizens, whose participation in decision making was restricted by the 
corrupted state system, managed to assure society, who experienced material 
deprivation and for whom, taking into consideration Soviet past, inequality was 
unacceptable, that political protest would cause regime change. 
As a conclusion with regard to the empirical part, several considerations can be 
made: together with political and material deprivation, there were other factors that 
influenced the former, such as the lack of the rule of law, corruption and the rigged 
election. During the evaluation of foreign influence, it is important to mention the 
support for strengthening the capacity of non-state actors, which had an important 
role in mobilizing society. The acting authority let the social protest bring the 
desired result – the change of regime. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that, over twelve years, Gamsakhurdia’s and 
Shevardnadze’s policies brought segregation to society and did not contribute to 
the reduction of the economic and ideological gap between social groups, nor 
could they ensure wider social participation in political decision-making, but if we 
take into account the number of elections held in Georgia since its independence, 
there were external signs of social engagement (Jones, 2013). 
 
5. References 
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2006). Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2013). Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty. Profilebooks. 
Ackeman, P. & DuVall, J. (2000). A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflicts. St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Arora, S.K. (1971). Political Participation: Deprivation and Protest. Economic and Political Weekly. 
Pp. 341 – 350. 
Bottomore, T. (1993). Political Sociology. Second Edition. Pluto Press. 
COMMUNICATIO 
 
 141 
Edited by Calleya, S. & Wohlfeld, M. (2012). Change and Opportunities in the Emerging 
Mediterranean. Part IV - Lessons Learned from Other Regions of the EU Neighbourhood, Chapter 
17. 334-348. Haran, O. between Russian and the EU: Lessons from the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine. 
Crosby, F. (1979). Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and Halligan. The 
American Political Science Review. Pp. 103 – 112 
Dorfman, R. (1979). A Formula for the Gini Coefficient. The Review of Economics and Statistics. Pp. 
146 – 149. 
Duclos, J.Y. & Gregoire, Ph. (2001). Web page. Retrieved from 
http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2001/47701.pdf. 
Fairbanks, Ch.H. (2001). Revolution Reconsidered. Journal of Democracy. Pp. 42 – 57. 
Fairbanks, Ch.H. (2001). Ten Years after the Soviet Breakup. Disillusionment in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. Journal of Democracy. Pp. 49 – 56. 
Gurr, T. (2005).Why Men Rebel. Piter. 
Gvalia, G. (2013). How Do Small States Choose their Strategic Alliances? Balancing and 
Bandwagoning Strategies in the South Caucasus. Ilia State University. 
Haran, O. (2011). From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine. The Journal 
of Post-Soviet Democratization. Pp. 93-110. 
Huntington, S.P. (1991). Democracy's Third Wave. Journal of Democracy. Pp. 12-34. 
Huntington, S.P. (2006). Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press. 
Jones, S. (2013). Georgia: A Political History since Independence. Center for Social Sciences. 
Kupatadze, A. (2016). Georgia’s Break with the Past. Journal of Democracy. Pp. 110-123. 
Lehman – Wilzig, S. & Ungar, M. (1985). The Economic and Political Determinants of Public Protest 
Frequency and Magnitude: the Israeli Experience. International Review of Modern Sociology. Pp. 63-
80. 
McFaul, M. (2002). The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in 
the Post Communist World. World Politics. Pp. 212-244. 
McFaul, M. (2005). Web page. Retrieved from http://sites.utoronto.ca/jacyk/files/wp4-mcfaul.pdf. 
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. The American Political Science 
Review. Pp. 567-576. 
Polese, A. & Beachain, D.O. (2011). The Color Revolution virus and authoritarian antidotes: political 
protest and regime counterattacks in Post-Communist spaces. Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-
Soviet Democratization. Pp. 111-132. 
Suny, R.G. (200). Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia. 
International Security. Pp. 139-178. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                      Vol. 11, No. 1/2017 
 
142 
Edited by Walker, I. & Smith, H.J. (2002). Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and 
Integration. Cambridge University Press. 
Yitzhaki, Sh. (1979). Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefficient. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Pp. 321-324. 
 
Authors’ Interviews 
(2012). Authors’ interview with Ivan Gomza, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Professor. Kyiv. 
(2012). Authors’ interview with Haran Olexiy, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Professor. Kyiv. 
(2016). Authors’ interview with Giorgi Zhgenti. Former Deputy Minister of IDPs of Georgia. Tbilisi. 
(2016). Authors’ interview with Archil Abashidze. Ilia State University Professor. Tbilisi. 
  
